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1. Introduction
Negotiations occur in procurement, commerce, health and government, among
organisations (companies and institutions) and individuals. For instance, electronic
procurement (respectively electronic commerce) consists of business-to-business (respectively
business-to-customer) purchase and provision of resources or services through the Internet.
Typically, organisations and individuals invite bids and negotiate costs, volume discounts or
special offers. These negotiations can be (at least partially) delegated to software components
in order to reach agreements (semi-)automatically (Jennings et al., 2001). For this purpose,
software agents must be associated with stakeholders in negotiations.
In negotiations, participation is voluntary and there is no third party imposing a resolution
of conflicts. Participants resolve their conflict by verbal means. The aim for all parties
is to “make a deal” while bargaining over their interests, typically seeking to maximise
their “good” (welfare), and prepared to concede some aspects while insisting on others.
Each side tries to figure out what other sides may want most, or may feel is most
important. Since real-world negotiations can be resolved by confronting and evaluating
the justifications of different positions, argumentation can support such a process. Logical
models of argument (Chesñevar et al., 2000) can be used to support rational decision
making by agents, to guide and empower negotiation amongst stakeholders and allow
them to reach agreements. With the support of argumentation processes, agents decide
which agreements can be acceptable to fulfil the requirements of users and the constraints
imposed by interlocutors, taking into account their expertises/preferences and the utilities
they assign to situations. This is the reason why many works in the area of Artificial
Intelligence focus on computational models of argumentation-based negotiation (Rahwan
et al., 2003). Logical models of arguments (e.g. Amgoud & Prade (2009); Bench-Capon
& Prakken (2006); Kakas & Moraitis (2003)) can be used to encompass the reasoning of
agents engaged in negotiations. However, these approaches do not come with a mechanism
allowing interacting agents to concede. Since agents can consider multiple goals which
may not be fulfilled all together by a set of non-conflicting decisions, e.g. a negotiation
agreement, high-ranked goals must be preferred to low-ranked goals on which agents can
concede. In this paper we propose an argumentation-based mechanism for decision-making
to concede. Adopting the assumption-based approach of argumentation, we propose here
an argumentation framework. It is built upon a logic language which holds statements
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representing knowledge, goals, and decisions. Preferences are attached to goals. These
concrete data structures consist of information providing the backbone of arguments. Due to
the abductive nature of practical commonsense reasoning, arguments are built by reasoning
backwards. Moreover, arguments are defined as tree-like structures. Our framework is
equipped with a computational counterpart (in the form of a formal mapping from it into
a set of assumption-based argumentation frameworks). Indeed, we provide the mechanism
for solving a decision problem, modeling the intuition that high-ranked goals are preferred
to low-ranked goals which can be withdrawn. Thus, we give a clear semantics to the
decisions. In this way, our framework suggests some decisions and provides an interactive
and intelligible explanation of this choice. Our implementation, called MARGO, is a
tool for multi-attribute qualitative decision-making as required, for instance in agent-based
negotiation or in service-oriented agents. In a more practical context, our framework is
amenable to industrial applications. In particular, MARGO has been used within the the
ArguGRID project1 for service selection and sevice negotiation.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic notions of argumentation
in the background of our work. Section 3 defines the core of our proposal, i.e. our
argumentation-based framework for decisionmaking. Firstly, we define the frameworkwhich
captures decision problems. Secondly, we define the arguments. Thirdly, we formalize
the interactions amongst arguments in order to define our AF (Argumentation Framework).
Finally, we provide the computational counterpart of our framework. Section 4 outlines
the implementation of our AF and its usage for service-oriented agents. Finally, section 5
discusses some related works and section 6 concludes with some directions for future work.
2. Background
Our argumentation approach is based on Dung’s abstract approach to defeasible
argumentation (Dung, 1995). Argumentation is abstractly defined as the interaction amongst
arguments, reasons supporting claims, which can be disputed by other arguments. In his
seminal work, Dung considers arguments as atomic and abstract entities interacting through
a binary relation over these interpreted as “the argument x attacks the argument y”. More
formally, an abstract argumentation framework (AAF for short) is defined as follows.
Definition 1 (AAF). An abstract argumentation framework is a pair aaf = 〈A, attacks 〉
where A is a finite set of arguments and attacks ⊆ A × A is a binary relation over A. When
(a,b) ∈ attacks , we say that a attacks b. Similarly, we say that the set S of arguments attacks b
when a ∈ S.
This framework is abstract since it specifies neither the nature of arguments nor the semantics
of the attack relation. However, an argument can be viewed as a reason supporting a claim
which can be challenged by other reasons.
According to this framework, Dung introduces various extension-based semantics in order to
analyse when a set of arguments can be considered as collectively justified.
Definition 2 (Semantics). Let aaf = 〈A, attacks 〉 be an abstract argumentation framework.
For S ⊆ A a set of arguments, we say that:
• S is conflict-free iff ∀a,b ∈ S it is not the case that a attacks b;
1 http://www.argugrid.eu
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• S is admissible (denoted admaaf(S)) iff S is conflict-free and S attacks every argument a such
that a attacks some arguments in S;
• S is preferred iff S is maximally admissible (with respect to set inclusion);
• S is complete iff S is admissible and S contains all arguments a such that S attacks all attacks
against a;
• S is grounded iff S is minimally complete (with respect to set inclusion);
• S is ideal iff S is admissible and it is contained in every preferred set.
These declarative model-theoretic semantics of the AAF capture various degrees of
justification, ranging from very permissive conditions, called credulous, to restrictive
requirements, called sceptical. The semantics of an admissible (or preferred) set of arguments
is credulous, in that it sanctions a set of arguments as acceptable if it can successfully
dispute every arguments against it, without disputing itself. However, there might be
several conflicting admissible sets. That is the reason why various sceptical semantics have
been proposed for the AAF, notably the grounded semantics and the sceptically preferred
semantics, whereby an argument is accepted if it is a member of all maximally admissible
(preferred) sets of arguments. The ideal semantics was not present in (Dung, 1995), but it has
been proposed recently (Dung et al., 2007) as a less sceptical alternative than the grounded
semantics but it is, in general, more sceptical than the sceptically preferred semantics.
Example 1 (AAF). In order to illustrate the previous notions, let us consider the abstract
argumentation framework aaf = 〈A, attacks 〉 where:
• A = {a, b, c, d};
• attacks = {(a, a), (a, b), (b, a), (c, d), (d, c)}.
The following graph represents this AAF, whereby the fact that “x attacks y” is depicted by a directed
arrow from x to y:
a b c d
We can notice that:
• {} is grounded;
• {b, d} and {b, c} are preferred.
• {b} is the maximal ideal set.
As previously mentionned, Dung’s seminal calculus of opposition deals neither with the
nature of arguments nor with the semantics of the attacks relation.
Unlike the abstract argumentation, assumption-based argumentation considers neither the
arguments nor the attack relations as primitives. Arguments are built by reasoning backwards
from conclusions to assumptions given a set of inference rules. Moreover, the attack relation is
defined in terms of a notion of “contrary”(Bondarenko et al., 1993; Dung et al., 2007). Actually,
assumption-based argumentation frameworks (ABFs, for short) are concrete instances of
AAFs built upon deductive systems.
The abstract view of argumentation does not deal with the problem of finding arguments and
attacks amongst them. Typically, arguments are built by joining rules, and attacks arise from
conflicts amongst such arguments.
Definition 3 (DS). A deductive system is a pair (L,R) where
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• L is a formal language consisting of countably many sentences, and
• R is a countable set of inference rules of the form r: α ← α1, . . . , αn where α ∈ L, called the head
of the rule (denoted head(r)), α1, . . . , αn ∈ L , called the body (denoted body(r)), and n ≥ 0.
If n = 0, then the inference rule represents an axiom (written simply as α). A deductive
system does not distinguish between domain-independent axioms/rules, which belong to
the specification of the logic, and domain-dependent axioms/rules, which represents a
background theory.
Due to the abductive nature of the practical reasoning, we define and construct arguments
by reasoning backwards. Therefore, arguments do not include irrelevant information such as
sentences not used to derive a conclusion.
Definition 4 (Deduction). Given a deductive system (L,R) and a selection function f , a (backward)
deduction of a conclusion α based on a set of premises P is a sequence of sets S1, . . . , Sm, where S1 =
{α}, Sm = {P}, and for every 1 ≤ i < m, where σ is the sentence occurrence in Si selected by f :
1. if σ is not in P then Si+1 = Si − {σ} ∪ S for some inference rule of the form σ ← S in the set of
inference rulesR;
2. if σ is in P then Si+1 = Si.
Deductions are the basis for the construction of arguments in assumption-based
argumentation. In order to obtain an argument from a backward deduction, we restrict the
premises to those ones that are taken for granted (called assumptions). Moreover, we need to
specify when one sentence contraries an assumptions to specify when one argument attacks
another. In this respect, an ABF considers a deductive system augmented by a non-empty
set of assumptions and a (total) mapping from assumptions to their contraries. In order to
perform decision making, we consider the generalisation of the original assumption-based
argumentation framework and the computational mechanisms, whereby multiple contraries
are allowed (Gartner & Toni, 2007).
Definition 5 (ABF). An assumption-based argumentation framework is a tuple
abf = 〈L,R,Asm, Con〉 where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system;
• Asm ⊆ L is a non-empty set of assumptions. If x ∈ Asm, then there is no inference rule in R
such that x is the head of this rule;
• Con: Asm → 2L is a (total) mapping from assumptions into set of sentences in L, i.e. their
contraries.
In the remainder of the paper, we restrict ourselves to finite deduction systems, i.e.
with finite languages and finite set of rules. For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to flat
frameworks (Bondarenko et al., 1993), i.e. whose assumptions do not occur as conclusions
of inference rules, such as logic programming or the argumentation framework proposed in
this paper.
In the assumption-based approach, the set of assumptions supporting a conclusion
encapsulates the essence of the argument.
Definition 6 (Argument). An argument for a conclusion is a deduction of that conclusion whose
premises are all assumptions. We denote an argument a for a conclusion α supported by a set of
assumptions A simply as a: A ⊢ α.
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The set of arguments built upon Asm is denoted A(Asm).
In an assumption-based argumentation framework, the attack relation amongst arguments
comes from the contrary relation.
Definition 7 (Attack relation). An argument a: A ⊢ α attacks an argument b: B ⊢ β iff there is an
assumption x ∈ B such as α ∈ Con(x).
According to the two previous definitions, an ABF is clearly a concrete instantiation of an AAF
where arguments are deductions and the attack relation comes from the contrary relation.
Example 2 (ABF). Let abf = 〈L,R,Asm, Con〉 be an assumption-based argumentation framework
where:
• (L,R) is a deductive system where,
– L = {α, β, δ, γ,¬α,¬β,¬δ,¬γ},
– R is the following set of rules,
¬α ← α
¬α ← β
¬β ← α
¬γ ← δ
¬δ ← γ
• Asm = {α, β,γ, δ}. Notice that no assumption is the head of an inference rule inR;
• and Con(α) = {¬α}, Con(β) = {¬β}, Con(γ) = {¬γ}, and Con(δ) = {¬δ}.
Some of the arguments in abf are the following:
{α} ⊢ ¬α
{α} ⊢ ¬β
{β} ⊢ ¬α
{γ} ⊢ ¬δ
{δ} ⊢ ¬γ
As stated in Dung et al. (2007), this ABF is a concrete instance of the AAF example proposed previously.
3. Proposal
This section presents our framework to perform decision making. Taking into account its
goals and preferences, an agent needs to solve a decision-making problemwhere the decision
amounts to an alternative it can select even if some goals cannot be reached. This agent uses
argumentation in order to assess the suitability of alternatives and to identify “optimal” ones.
It argues internally to link the alternatives, their features and the benefits that these features
guarantee under possibly incomplete knowledge.
We present here the core of our proposal, i.e. an argumentation framework for decision
making. Section 3.1 introduces the walk-through example. Section 3.2 introduces the
framework used to capture decision problems. Section 3.3 defines the arguments. Section 3.4
defines the interactions amongst our arguments. Section 3.5 defines our AF. Finally, Section 3.6
presents its computational counterpart.
21Arguing over Goals for Negotiation:dopting n Assumption-Based Argum ntation Deci ion Support System
www.intechopen.com
6 Efficient Decision Support Systems: Practice and Challenges â ˘AS¸ From Current to Future / Book 1
3.1 Walk-through example
We consider e-procurement scenarios where buyers seek to purchase earth observation
services from sellers (Stournaras, 2007). Each agent represents a user, i.e. a service requester
or a service provider. The negotiation of the fittest image is a complex task due to the
number of possible choices, their characteristics and the preferences of the users. Therefore,
this usecase is interesting enough for the evaluation of our argumentation-based mechanism
for decision-making (Bromuri et al., 2009; Morge & Mancarella, 2010). For simplicity, we
abstract away from the real world data of these features and we present here an intuitive
and illustrative scenario.
In our scenario, we consider a buyer that seeks to purchase a service s(x) from a seller.
The latter is responsible for the four following concrete instances of services: s(a), s(b),
s(c) and s(d). These four concrete services reflect the combinations of their features (cf
Tab. 1). For instance, the price of s(a) is high (Price(a,high)), its resolution is low
(Resolution(a,low)) and its delivery time is high (DeliveryTime(a,high)). According
to the preferences and the constraints of the user represented by the buyer: the cost must be
low (cheap); the resolution of the service must be high (good); and the delivery time must be
low (fast). Additionally, the buyer is not empowered to concede about the delivery time but
it can concede indifferently about the resolution and/or the cost. According to the preferences
and constraints of the user represented by the seller: the cost of the service must be high;
the resolution of the service must be low; and the delivery time must be high (slow). The
seller is not empowered to concede about the cost but it can concede indifferently about
the resolution or/and the delivery time. The agents attempt to come to an agreement on
the contract for the provision of a service s(x). Taking into account some goals, preferences
and constraints, the buyer (resp. the seller) needs to interactively solve a decision-making
problem where the decision amounts to a service it can buy (resp. provide).
Service Price Resolution DeliveryTime
s(a) high low high
s(b) high high high
s(c) high low low
s(d) low low low
Table 1. The four concrete services and their features
The decision problem of the buyer can be captured by an abstract argumentation framework
which contains the following arguments:
• d1 - He will buy s(d) if the seller accepts it since the cost is low;
• d2 - He will buy s(d) if the seller accepts it since the delivery time is low;
• c - He will buy s(c) if the seller accepts it since the delivery time is low;
Due to the mutual exclusion between the alternatives, c attacks d1, c attacks d2, d1 attacks c
and d2 attacks c. Wewill illustrate our concrete argumentation framework for decisionmaking
with the decision problem of the buyer.
3.2 Decision framework
Since we want to provide a computational model of argumentation for decision making
and we want to instantiate it for particular problems, we need to specify a particular
language, allowing us to express statements about the various different entities involved
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in the knowledge representation for decision making. In our framework, the knowledge is
represented by a logical theory built upon an underlying logic-based language.
In this language we distinguish between several different categories of predicate symbols.
First of all, we use goals to represent the possible objectives of the decision making process.
For instance, the goal fast represents the objective of a buyer who would like to obtain a
quick answer. We will denote by G the set of predicate symbols denoting goals.
In the language we also want to distinguish symbols representing the decisions an agent can
adopt. For instance, in the procurement example a unary predicate symbol s(x) can be used
to represent the decision of the buyer to select the service x. It is clear that a problem may
involve some decisions over different items, which will correspond to adoptingmany decision
predicate symbols (this is not the case in our running example). We will denote by D the set
of the predicate symbols for representing decisions.
In order to represent further knowledge about the domain under consideration, we will adopt
also a set of predicate symbols for beliefs, denoted by B. Furthermore, in many situations
the knowledge about a decision making problem may be incomplete, and it may require to
make assumptions to carry on the reasoning process. This will be tackled by selecting, in
the set B, those predicate symbols representing presumptions (denoted by Psm). For instance,
in the procurement example, the decision made by the buyer may (and will indeed) depend
upon the way the buyer thinks the seller replies to the buyer’s offer, either by accepting or by
rejecting it. This can be represented by a presumption reply(x), where x is either accept or
reject.
In a decision making problem, we need to express preferences between different goals and the
reservation value, that is the lowest (in terms of preference) set of goals under which the agent
cannot concede. For instance, in the procurement example, the buyer prefers to minimize
the price. Hence, its knowledge base should somehow represent the fact that the goal fast
should be preferred to cheap. On the other hand, the buyer is prepared to concede on the
price in order to achieve an agreement with the seller, but it may be not ready to concede on
the delivery time which must be low. Hence, its knowledge base should somehow represent
the fact that these goals consist of its reservation value.
Finally, we allow the representation of explicit incompatibilities between goals and/or
decisions. For instance, different alternatives for the same decision predicate are incompatible
with each other, e.g. s(a) is incompatible with s(b). On the other hand, different goals may
be incompatible with one another. For instance, cheap is incompatible with expensive,
whereas expensive is not incompatible with good. Incompatibilities between goals and
between decisions will be represented through a binary relation denoted by I .
The above informal discussion can be summarized by the definition of decision framework
(Definition 8 below). For the sake of simplicity, in this definition, as well as in the rest of
the paper, we will assume some familiarity with the basic notions of logic languages (such
as terms, atomic formulae, clauses etc.) Moreover, we will not explicitly introduce formally
all the components of the underlying logic language, in order to focus our attention to those
components which are relevant to our decision making context. So, for instance, we assume
that the constants and function symbols over which terms are built (i.e. predicate arguments)
are given. Finally, given a set of predicate symbols X in the language, we will still use X to
denote the set of all possible atomic formulae built on predicates belonging to X. If not clear
from the context, we will point out whether we refer to the predicate symbols in X rather than
to the atomic formulae built on X.
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Definition 8 (Decision framework). A decision framework is a tuple
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉, where:
• DL = G ∪D ∪B is a set of predicate symbols called the decision language, where we distinguish
between goals (G), decisions (D) and beliefs (B);
• Psm is a set of atomic formulae built upon predicates in DL called presumptions;
• I is the incompatibility relation, i.e. a binary relation over atomic formulae in G , B or D. I
is not necessarily symmetric;
• T is a logic theory built upon DL; statements in T are clauses, each of which has a distinguished
name;
• P ⊆ G × G is the priority relation, namely a transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric relation over
atomic formulae in G ;
• RV is a set of literals built upon predicates in G , called the reservation value.
Let us summarize the intuitive meaning of the various components of the framework. The
language DL is composed by:
• the set of goal predicates, i.e. some predicate symbols which represent the features that a
decision must exhibit;
• the set D of decision predicates, i.e. some predicate symbols which represent the actions
which must be performed or not; different atoms built onD represent different alternatives;
• the set B of beliefs, i.e. some predicate symbols which represent epistemic statements;.
In this way, we can consider multiple objectives which may or not be fulfilled by a set of
decisions under certain circumstances.
We explicitly distinguish presumable (respectively non-presumable) literals which can
(respectively cannot) be assumed to hold, as long as there is no evidence to the contrary.
Decisions as well as some beliefs can be assumed. In this way, DF can model the
incompleteness of knowledge.
The most natural way to represent conflicts in our object language is by means of some
forms of logical negation. We consider two types of negation, as usual, e.g., in extended
logic programming, namely strong negation ¬ (also called explicit or classical negation), and
weak negation ∼, also called negation as failure. As a consequence we will distinguish between
strong literals, i.e. atomic formulae possibly preceded by strong negation, and weak literals,
i.e. literals of the form∼ L, where L is a strong literal. The intuitive meaning of a strong literal
¬L is “L is definitely not the case”, while ∼ L intuitively means “There is no evidence that L
is the case”.
The set I of incompatibilities contains some default incompatibilities related to negation on
the one hand, and to the nature of decision predicates on the other hand. Indeed, given an
atom A, we have A I ¬A as well as ¬A I A. Moreover, L I ∼ L, whatever L is, representing
the intuition that L is evidence to the contrary of ∼ L. Notice, however, that we do not have
∼ L I L, as in the spirit of weak negation. Other default incompatibilities are related to
decisions, since different alternatives for the same decision predicate are incompatible with
one another. Hence, D(a1) I D(a2) and D(a2) I D(a1), D being a decision predicate inD, and
a1 and a2 being different constants representing different2 alternatives for D. Depending on
the particular decision problem being represented by the framework, I may contain further
2 Notice that in general a decision can be addressed by more than two alternatives.
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non-default incompatibilities. For instance, we may have g I g′, where g, g′ are different goals
(as cheap I expensive in the procurement example). To summarize, the incompatibility
relation captures the conflicts, either default or domain dependent, amongst decisions, beliefs
and goals.
The incompatibility relation can be easily lifted to set of sentences. We say that two sets of
sentences Φ1 and Φ2 are incompatible (still denoted by Φ1 I Φ2) iff there is a sentence φ1 in Φ1
and a sentence φ2 in Φ2 such that φ1 I φ2.
A theory gathers the statements about the decision problem.
Definition 9 (Theory). A theory T is an extended logic program, i.e a finite set of rules R: L0 ←
L1, . . . , Lj,∼ Lj+1, . . . ,∼ Ln with n ≥ 0, each Li (with i ≥ 0) being a strong literal in L. R, called
the unique name of the rule, is an atomic formula of L. All variables occurring in a rule are implicitly
universally quantified over the whole rule. A rule with variables is a scheme standing for all its ground
instances.
Considering a decision problem, we distinguish:
• goal rules of the form R: G0 ← G1, . . . ,Gn with n > 0, where each Gi (i ≥ 0) is a goal
literal in DL (or its strong negation). According to this rule, the goal G0 is promoted (or
demoted) by the combination of the goal literals in the body;
• epistemic rules of the form R: B0 ← B1, . . . , Bn with n ≥ 0, where each Bi (i ≥ 0) is a belief
literal of DL. According to this rule, B0 is true if the conditions B1, . . . , Bn are satisfied;
• decision rules of the form R: G ← D1(a1), . . . ,Dm(am), B1, . . . , Bn with m ≥ 1, n ≥ 0. The
head of the rule is a goal (or its strong negation). The body includes a set of decision
literals (Di(ai) ∈ L) and a (possibly empty) set of belief literals. According to this rule, the
goal is promoted (or demoted) by the decisions {D1(a1), . . . ,Dm(am)}, provided that the
conditions B1, . . . , Bn are satisfied.
For simplicity, we will assume that the names of rules are neither in the bodies nor in the head
of the rules thus avoiding self-reference problems. Moreover, we assume that the elements
in the body of rules are independent (the literals cannot be deduced from each other), the
decisions do not influence the beliefs, and the decisions have no side effects.
Considering statements in the theory is not sufficient to make a decision. In order to evaluate
the previous statements, other relevant pieces of information should be taken into account,
such as the priority amongst goals. For this purpose, we consider the priority relation P over
the goals in G , which is transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric. G1PG2 can be read “G1 has
priority over G2”. There is no priority between G1 and G2, either because G1 and G2 are ex
æquo (denoted G1 ≃ G2), or because G1 and G2 are not comparable. The priority corresponds
to the relative importance of the goals as far as solving the decision problem is concerned. For
instance, we can prefer a fast service rather than a cheap one. This preference can be captured
by the priority. The reservation is the minimal set of goals which needs to be reached. The
reservation value is the least favourable point at which onewill accept a negotiated agreement.
It would mean the bottom line that one would be prepared to concede.
In order to illustrate the previous notions, we provide here the decision framework related to
the problem described in Section 3.1.
Example 3 (Decision framework). We consider the procurement example which is described in
Section 3.1. The buyer’s decision problem is captured by a decision framework
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 where:
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• the decision language DL distinguishes
– a set of goals G = {cheap,expensive,fast,slow,bad,good}. This set of literals
identifies various goals as the cost (cheap or expensive), the quality of service (good or
bad) and the availability (slow or fast),
– a set of decisions D = {s(x) | x ∈ {a,b,c,d}}. This set of literals identifies different
alternatives,
– a set of beliefs, i.e. a set of literals identifying various features Price(x, y),
Resolution(x, y) and DeliveryTime(x, y) with x ∈ {a,b,c,d}, y ∈ {high,low}
(which means that y is the level of a certain feature of x) and a set of literals identifying the
possible replies of the responders {reply(y) | y ∈ {accept,reject}};
• the set of presumptions Psm contains the possible replies;
• the incompatibility relation I is trivially defined. In particular,
reply(accept) I reply(reject),
reply(reject) I reply(accept), and
s(x) I s(y), with x = y
good I bad, bad I good, expensive I cheap, cheap I expensive,
slow I fast, fast I slow;
• the theory T (whatever the agent is the buyer or the seller) is the set of rules shown in Table 2;
• the preferences of the buyer in our example are such that:
fastPcheap and fastPgood;
• The reservation value of the buyer is defined as: RV = {fast}. If the agent is the seller, then the
reservation value is defined as : RV = {expensive}.
r11(x): expensive← s(x),Price(x,high),reply(accept)
r12(x): cheap← s(x),Price(x,low),reply(accept)
r21(x): good← s(x),Resolution(x,high),reply(accept)
r22(x): bad← s(x),Resolution(x,low),reply(accept)
r31(x): fast← s(x),DeliveryTime(x,low),reply(accept)
r32(x): slow← s(x),DeliveryTime(x,high),reply(accept)
f11: Price(a,high) ←
f12: Resolution(a,low)←
f13: DeliveryTime(a,high) ←
f21: Price(b,high) ←
f22: Resolution(b,high) ←
f23: DeliveryTime(b,high) ←
f31: Price(c,high) ←
f32: Resolution(c,low)←
f33: DeliveryTime(c,low) ←
f41: Price(d,low) ←
f42: Resolution(d,low)←
f43: DeliveryTime(d,low) ←
Table 2. The rules of the agents
Our formalism allows to capture the incomplete representation of a decision problem with
presumable beliefs. Arguments are built upon these incomplete statements.
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3.3 Arguments
In order to turn the decision framework presented in the previous section into a concrete
argumentation framework, we need first to define the notion of argument. Since we want
that our AF not only suggests some decisions but also provides an intelligible explanation of
them, we adopt a tree-like structure of arguments. We adopt here the tree-like structure for
arguments proposed in (Vreeswijk, 1997) and we extend it with presumptions on the missing
information.
Informally, an argument is a deduction for a conclusion from a set of presumptions
represented as a tree, with conclusion at the root and presumptions at the leaves. Nodes in
this tree are connected by the inference rules, with sentences matching the head of an inference
rule connected as parent nodes to sentencesmatching the body of the inference rule as children
nodes. The leaves are either presumptions or the special extra-logical symbol ⊤, standing for
an empty set of premises. Formally:
Definition 10 (Structured argument). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision
framework. A structured argument built upon DF is composed by a conclusion, some premises, some
presumptions, and some sentences. These elements are abbreviated by the corresponding prefixes (e.g.
conc stands for conclusion). A structured argument A¯ can be:
1. a hypothetical argument built upon an unconditional ground statement. If L is either a decision
literal or an presumable belief literal (or its strong/weak negation), then the argument built upon a
ground instance of this presumable literal is defined as follows:
conc(A¯) = L,
premise(A¯) = ∅,
psm(A¯) = {L},
sent(A¯) = {L}.
or
2. a built argument built upon a rule such that all the literals in the body are the conclusion of
arguments.
2.1) If f is a fact in T (i.e. body( f ) = ⊤3), then the trivial argument A¯ built upon this fact is
defined as follows:
conc(A¯) = head( f ),
premise(A¯) = {⊤},
psm(A¯) = ∅,
sent(A¯) = {head( f )}.
2.2) If r is a rule in T with body(r) = {L1, . . . , Lj,∼ Lj+1, . . . ,∼ Ln} and there is a collection
of structured arguments {A¯1, . . . , A¯n} such that, for each strong literal Li ∈ body(r), Li =
conc(A¯i) with i ≤ j and for each weak literal∼ Li ∈ body(r),∼ Li = conc(A¯i) with i > j,
we define the tree argument A¯ built upon the rule r and the set {A¯1, . . . , A¯n} of structured
arguments as follows:
conc(A¯) = head(r),
premise(A¯) = body(r),
psm(A¯)=
⋃
A¯i∈{A¯1,...,A¯n}
psm(A¯i),
sent(A¯)=body(r) ∪ {head(r)} ∪
⋃
A¯i∈{A¯1,...,A¯n}
sent(A¯i).
3 ⊤ denotes the unconditionally true statement.
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The set of structured arguments {A¯1, . . . , A¯n} is denoted by sbarg(A¯), and its elements are
called the subarguments of A¯.
The set of arguments built upon DF is denoted by A(DF).
Notice that the subarguments of a tree argument concluding the weak literals are hypothetical
arguments. Indeed, the conclusion of an hypothetical argument could be a strong or a weak
literal, while the conclusion of a built argument is a strong literal. As in (Vreeswijk, 1997),
we consider composite arguments, called tree arguments, and atomic arguments, called trivial
arguments. Unlike the other definitions of arguments (set of assumptions, set of rules), our
definition considers that the different premises can be challenged and can be supported by
subarguments. In this way, arguments are intelligible explanations. Moreover, we consider
hypothetical arguments which are built upon missing information or a suggestion, i.e. a
decision. In this way, our framework allows to reason further by making suppositions related
to the unknown beliefs and over possible decisions.
Let us consider the previous example.
Example 4 (Arguments). The arguments D¯2 and C¯ concluding
fast are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, respectively. They are arguments concluding that the availability
is promoted since the delivery time of the services c and d is low. For this purpose we need to suppose
that the seller’s reply will be an acceptance. An argument can be represented as a tree where the
root is the conclusion (represented by a triangle) directly connected to the premises (represented by
losanges) if they exist, and where leaves are either decisions/presumptions (represented by circles) or
the unconditionally true statement. Each plain arrow corresponds to a rule (or a fact) where the head
node corresponds to the head of the rule and the tall nodes represent the literals in the body of the rule.
The tree arguments C¯ and D¯2 are composed of three subarguments: two hypothetical and one trivial
argument. Neither trivial arguments nor hypothetical arguments contain subarguments.
3.4 Interactions between arguments
In order to turn the decision framework into an argumentation framework, we need to capture
the interactions between arguments. The interactions amongst structured arguments may
come from their conflicts and from the priority over the goals which are promoted by these
arguments. We examine in turn these different sources of interaction. Firstly, we define the
attack relation amongst conflicting structured arguments in the same way we have defined
the attack relation in the assumption-based argumentation frameworks. Secondly, we define
the strength of arguments. Finally, we define the defeat relation amongst the structured
arguments to capture the whole of interactions amongst them.
Since their sentences are conflicting, the structured arguments interact with one another. For
this purpose, we define the following attack relation.
Definition 11 (Attack relation). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework, and
A¯, B¯ ∈ A(DF) be two structured arguments. A¯ attacks B¯ iff sent(A¯) I sent(B¯).
This relation encompasses both the direct (often called rebuttal) attack due to the
incompatibility of the conclusions, and the indirect (often called undermining) attack, i.e.
directed to a “subconclusion”. According to this definition, if an argument attacks a
subargument, the whole argument is attacked.
Let us go back to our example.
Example 5 (Attack relation). D¯2 (respectively C¯) is built upon the hypothetical subargument
supposing s(d) (respectively s(c)). Therefore, C¯ and D¯ attack each other.
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D¯2
fast
s(d)
s(d)
reply(accept)
r31(d)
reply(accept)
Price(d,low)
⊤
f43
Fig. 1. The argument D¯2 concluding fast
Arguments are concurrent if their conclusions are identical or incompatible. In order to
compare the strength of concurrent arguments, various domain-independent principles of
commonsense reasoning can be applied. According to the specificity principle (Simari
& Loui, 1992), the most specific argument is stronger one. According to the weakest
link principle (Amgoud & Cayrol, 2002), an argument cannot be justified unless all of its
subarguments are justified. In accordance with the last link principle (Prakken & Sartor,
1997), the strength of our arguments comes from the preferences between the sentence of
the arguments. By contrast, the strength of our argument does not depend on the quality of
information used to build that argument but it is determinated by its conclusion.
Definition 12 (Strength relation). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework
and A¯1, A¯2 ∈ A(DF) be two structured which are concurrent. A¯1 is stronger than A¯2 (denoted
A¯1PA¯2) iff conc(A¯1) = g1 ∈ G , conc(A¯2) = g2 ∈ G and g1Pg2.
Due to the definition of P over T , the relation P is transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric over
A(DF).
The attack relation and the strength relation can be combined. As in (Amgoud & Cayrol, 1998;
Bench-Capon, 2002), we distinguish between one argument attacking another, and that attack
succeeding due to the strength of arguments.
Definition 13 (Defeat relation). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework and
A¯ and B¯ be two structured arguments. A¯ defeats B¯ iff:
1. A¯ attacks B¯;
2. and it is not the case that B¯PA¯.
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C¯
fast
s(c)
s(c)
reply(accept)
r31(c)
reply(accept)
Price(c,low)
⊤
f33
Fig. 2. The argument C¯ concluding fast
Similarly, we say that a set S of structured arguments defeats a structured argument A¯ if A¯ is defeated
by one argument in S.
Let us consider our example.
Example 6 (Defeat relation). As previously mentionned, C¯ and D¯2 attack each other and they
conclude the same goal fast. We can deduce that C¯ and D¯2 defeat each other.
3.5 Argumentation framework
We are now in the position of summarizingwhat is our argumentation framework for decision
making. In doing this, we also inherit the semantics defined by Dung to analyse when a
decision can be considered as acceptable.
As we have seen, in our argumentation-based approach for decision making, arguments
motivate decisions and they can be defeated by other arguments. More formally, our
argumentation framework (AF for short) is defined as follows.
Definition 14 (AF). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework.
The argumentation framework for decision making built upon DF is a pair AF =
〈A(DF), defeats 〉 where A(DF) is the finite set of structured arguments built upon DF as defined
in Definition 8, and defeats ⊆ A(DF)×A(DF) is the binary relation over A(DF) as defined in
Definition 13.
We adapt Dung’s extension-based semantics in order to analyse whenever a set of structured
arguments can be considered as subjectively justified with respect to the preferences.
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Definition 15 (Semantics). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework and AF =
〈A(DF), defeats 〉 be our argumentation framework for decision making. For S¯ ⊆ A(DF) a set of
structured arguments, we say that:
• S¯ is subjectively conflict-free iff ∀A¯, B¯ ∈ S¯ it is not the case that A¯ defeats B¯;
• S¯ is subjectively admissible (s-admissible for short), denoted sadmAF(S¯), iff S¯ is subjectively
conflict-free and S¯ defeats every argument A¯ such that A¯ defeats some argument in S¯;
We restrict ourselves to the subjective admissibility, but the other Dung’s extension-based
semantics (cf Definition 2) can be easily adapted.
Formally, given a structured argument A¯, let
dec(A¯) = {D(a) ∈ psm(A¯) | D is a decision predicate}
be the set of decisions supported by the structured argument A¯.
The decisions are suggested to reach a goal if they are supported by a structured argument
concluding this goal and this argument is a member of an s-admissible set of arguments.
Definition 16 (Credulous decisions). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision
framework, g ∈ G be a goal and D ⊆ D be a set of decisions. The decisions D credulously argue
for g iff there exists an argument A¯ in a s-admissible set of arguments such that conc(A¯) = g and
dec(A¯) = D. We denote valc(D) the set of goals in G for which the set of decisions D credulously
argues.
It is worth noticing that the decisions which credulously argue for a goal cannot contain
mutual exclusive alternatives for the same decision predicate. This is due to the fact that a
s-admissible set of arguments is subjectively conflict-free.
If we consider the structured arguments A¯ and B¯ supporting the decisions D(a) and D(b)
respectively where a and b are mutually exclusive alternatives, we have D(a) I D(b) and
D(a) I D(b) and so, either A¯ defeats B¯ or B¯ defeats A¯ or both of them depending on
the strength of these arguments.
Proposition 1 (Mutual exclusive alternatives). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework, g ∈ G be a goal and AF =
〈A(DF), defeats 〉 be the argumentation framework for decision making built upon DF. If S¯ be
a s-admissible set of arguments such that, for some A¯ ∈ S¯, g = conc(A¯) and D(a) ∈ psm(A¯), then
D(b) ∈ psm(A¯) iff a = b.
However, notice that mutual exclusive decisions can be suggested for the same goal through
different s-admissible sets of arguments. This case reflects the credulous nature of our
semantics.
Definition 17 (Skeptical decisions). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework, g ∈ G be a goal and D,D′ ⊆ D be two sets
of decisions. The set D of decisions skeptically argue for g iff for all s-admissible set of arguments S¯
such that for some arguments A¯ in S¯ conc(A¯) = g, then dec(A¯) = D. We denote vals(D) the set of
goals in G for which the set of decisions D skeptically argues. The decisions D is skeptically preferred
to the decisions D′ iff vals(D)Pvals(D′).
Due to the uncertainties, some decisions satisfy goals for sure if they skeptically argue for
them, or some decisions can possibly satisfy goals if they credulously argue for them. While
the first case is required for convincing a risk-averse agent, the second case is enough to
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convince a risk-taking agent. Since some ultimatum choices amongst various justified sets
of alternatives are not always possible, we will consider in this paper the most “skeptically
preferred” decisions.
The decision making process can be described as the cognitive process in which an agent
evaluates the alternatives that are available, according to their features, to determine whether
and how they satisfy his needs. The principle for decision making we adopt is that
higher-ranked goals should be pursued at the expense of lower-ranked goals, and thus choices
enforcing higher-ranked goals should be preferred to those enforcing lower-ranked goals. We
are in a situation where there is a ranking of individual objects (the preferences between goals)
and we need a ranking that involve subsets of these objects (See Barber et al. (2004) for a
survey). For this purpose, we adopt the minmax ordering.
Definition 18 (Preferences). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework. We
consider G, G′ two sets of goals in G and D, D′ two sets of decisions in D. G is preferred to G (denoted
GPG′) iff
1. G ⊃ G′, and
2. ∀g ∈ G \ G′ there is no g′ ∈ G′ such that g′Pg.
D is credulously preferred (respectively skeptically preferred) to D′ (denoted DPcD′ and DPsD′) iff
valc(D)Pvalc(D′) (respectively vals(D)Pvals(D′)).
Formally, let
SAD = {D | D ⊆ D such that RV ⊆ vals(D) and
∀D′ ⊆ D it is not the case that RV ⊆ vals(D′) and vals(D′) P vals(D)}
be the set of decisions which can be skeptically accepted by the agent. Additionally, let
SAG = {G | G ⊆ G such that G = vals(D) with D ∈ SAD}
be the goals which can be skeptically reached by the agent.
As an example of the decision making principle, consider the goals g0, g1 and g2 such that
g2Pg1, g2Pg0 and RV = {g0}. {g2, g1, g0} is preferred to both {g2, g0}, {g2, g1} whereas
{g2, g0}, {g2, g1} are incomparable and so equally preferred. However, {g2, g1} cannot be
reached by the agent since it does not includes the reservation value.
Let us consider now the buyer’s decision problem in the procurement example.
Example 7 (Semantics). The structured argument C¯ and D¯2, which are depicted in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2,
conclude fast. Actually, the sets of decisions {s(c)} and {s(d)} credulously argue for f ast. The
decisions {s(d)} skeptically argue for cheap and a fortiori credulously argue for it. Therefore,
{s(d)} is a skeptically acceptable set of decisions. The reservation value of the buyer only contains
fast. Therefore, {s(d)} is skeptically preferred to {s(c)} and {s(d)} is a skeptical acceptable set of
decisions due to the reservation value and the priority over the goals.
In our example, there is only one suggested set of decisions.
Since agents can consider multiple objectives which may not be fulfilled all together by a set of
non-conflicting decisions, they may have to make some concessions, i.e. surrender previous
proposals. Concessions are crucial features of agent-based negotiation. Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
and Gilad Zlotkin have proposed a monotonic concession protocol for bilateral negotiations
in Rosenschein & Zlotkin (1994). In this protocol, each agent starts from the deal that is best for
him and either concedes or stands stills in each round. A (monotonic) concession means that
an agent proposes a new deal that is better for the other agent. Differently fromRosenschein &
Zlotkin (1994), we do not assume that the agent has an interlocutor and if it does, that it does
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not know the preferences of its interlocutors. We say that a decision is a minimal concession
whenever there is no other preferred decisions.
Definition 19 (Minimal concession). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework.
The decision dec ∈ D is a concession with respect to dec′ ∈ D iff there exists a set of decisions D
such that dec ∈ D and for all D′ ⊆ D with dec′ ∈ D′, it is not the case that DPD′. The decision dec
is a minimal concession wrt dec′ iff it is a concession wrt dec′ and there is no dec′′ ∈ D such that
• dec′′ is a concession wrt dec′, and
• there is D′′ ⊆ D with dec′′ ∈ D′′ with D′′PD.
The minimal concessions are computed by the computational counterpart of our
argumentation framework.
Example 8 (Minimal concession). According to the buyer, {s(c)} is a minimal concession with
respect to {s(d)}.
3.6 Computational counterpart
Having defined our argumentation framework for decision making, we need to find a
computational counterpart for it. For this purpose, we move our AF to an ABF (cf. Section 2)
which can be computed by the dialectical proof procedure of (Dung et al., 2006) extended
in (Gartner & Toni, 2007). So that, we can compute the suggestions for reaching a goal.
Additionally, we provide the mechanism for solving a decision problem, modeling the
intuition that high-ranked goals are preferred to low-ranked goals which can be withdrawn.
The idea is to map our argumentation framework built upon a decision framework
into a collection of assumption-based argumentation frameworks, that we call practical
assumption-based argumentation frameworks (PABFs for short). Basically, for each rule r in the
theory we consider the assumption ∼ deleted(r) in the set of possible assumptions. By
means of this new predicate, we distinguish in a PABF the several distinct arguments that give
rise to the same conclusion. Considering a set of goals, we allow each PABF in the collection
to include (or not) the rules whose heads are these goals (or their strong negations). Indeed,
two practical assumption-based frameworks in this collection may differ in the set of rules
that they adopt. In this way, the mechanism consists of a search in the collection of PABFs.
Definition 20 (PABF). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework and G ∈ G a set
of goals such that G ⊇ RV . A practical assumption-based argumentation framework built upon
DF associated with the goals G is a tuple pabfDF(G) = 〈LDF,RDF,AsmDF, ConDF〉 where:
(i) LDF = DL ∪ {deleted}4;
(ii)RDF, the set of inference rules, is defined as follows:
– For each rule r ∈ T , there exists an inference rule R ∈ RDF such that head(R) = head(r)
and body(R) = body(r) ∪ {∼ deleted(r)};
– If r1,r2 ∈ T with head(r1) I head(r2) and it is not the case that head(r2)Phead(r1),
then the inference rule
deleted(r2) ←∼ deleted(r1) is inRDF.
(iii)AsmDF, the set of assumptions, is defined such that AsmDF = ∆ ∪Φ ∪Ψ ∪ Υ ∪ Σ where:
– ∆ = {D(a) ∈ L | D(a) is a decision literal },
4 We assume deleted ∈ L.
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– Φ = {B ∈ B | B ∈ Psm},
– Ψ = {∼ deleted(r) | r ∈ T and head(r) ∈ {L,¬L} s.t. L ∈ G},
– Υ = {∼ deleted(r) | r ∈ T and head(r) ∈ {g,¬g} s.t. g ∈ RV};
– Σ = {∼ deleted(r) | r ∈ T and head(r) ∈ {g,¬g} s.t. g ∈ G−RV};
(iv)ConDF the set of contraries is defined such that for all α ∈ AsmDF, y ∈ Con(α) iff y I α.
The set of practical assumption-based argumentation frameworks built upon DF and associated with
the goals G′ withRV ⊆ G′ ⊆ G will be denoted PABFSDF(G).
Case (i) defines the language. In order to capture the decision problem within an
assumption-based argumentation framework, we have extended the decision language to
include a predicate symbol deleted, which is used to specify whether or not a rule is
adopted within the PABF. It is worth noticing that the definition of arguments in the ABF (cf
Definition 6) focuses attention on the candidate assumptions and ignores the internal structure
of arguments. In order to distinguish in a PABF the several distinct arguments that give rise
to the same conclusion, we have named the rules used to deduce it. Therefore, an argument
in a PABF contains a set of assumptions of the following schemata ∼ deleted(r), for all rule
r used by the argument.
Case (ii) defines the inference rules. Firstly, there is an inference rule for each rule of the theory.
For this purpose, the body of each rule r is extended by adding the assumption∼ deleted(r).
Referring to Example 3, the rule r11(x) becomes
expensive← s(x),Price(x,high),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r11(x)).
In this way, the assumption ∼ deleted(r11(x)) allows an argument to use this rule.
Secondly, the inference rules include not only the original deduction rules but also the conflicts
amongst the rules having incompatible heads. It is worth noticing that the attack relation
between arguments in the ABF (cf Def. 7) ignores the possible conflicts amongst the heads of
rules which are not assumptions. In order to capture these conflicts, we have introduced rules
which allow the defeasibility of rules. Referring to the example, we introduce, e.g.,
deleted(r12(x)) ←∼ deleted(r11(x))
modeling the given incompatibility cheap I expensive. Obviously, we also introduce,
deleted(r11(x)) ←∼ deleted(r12(x))
modeling the given incompatibility expensive I cheap. Our treatment of conflicting rules
requires not to interfere with our treatment of priorities which is inspired by (Kowalski &
Toni, 1996). Referring to the example, we introduce, e.g.,
deleted(r12(x)) ←∼ deleted(r31(x))
modeling the given priority cheapPfast. In this way, the corresponding literal
∼ deleted(r31(x)) must be assumed in order to handle this priority. Obviously, we do not
introduce,
deleted(r31(x)) ←∼ deleted(r12(x)).
Case (iii) defines the assumptions. The decisions are obviously possible assumptions. In the
same way, a PABF adopts an presumable belief if this is a presumption of the corresponding
AF. Referring to the example, an argument, which assumes that the reply is an acceptance,
can be built since reply(accept) ∈ AsmDF. Each framework adopt the epistemic rules, i.e
r with head(r) ∈ {L,¬L} and L ∈ G , by having the assumption ∼ deleted(r) in its set of
assumptions.
Wewant to go through the set of goals such that high-ranked goals are preferred to low-ranked
goals and the reservation value is the minimal set of goals we want to reach. For this
purpose, we adopt the rules concluding the goals (or their negation) in the reservation value,
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i.e r with head(r) ∈ {g,¬g} and g ∈ RV , by having the assumption ∼ deleted(r) in
its set of assumptions. However, each framework in PABFSDF(G) can or cannot adopt the
rules concluding the goals (or their negation) which are not in the reservation value, i.e. r
with head(r) ∈ {g,¬g} and g ∈ G − RV by having the assumption ∼ deleted(r) in its
set of assumptions. Referring to the running example and considering the goal cheap the
strongest structured arguments concluding cheap, requiresr12(x) to be built within the PABF
if ∼ deleted(r12(x)) ∈ AsmDF.
Case (iv) defines the contrary relation of a PABFwhich trivially comes from the incompatibility
relation and which comes from the contradiction of deleted(r) with ∼ deleted(r)
whatever the rule r is.
Arguments will be built upon rules, the candidate decisions, and by making suppositions
within the presumable beliefs. Formally, given a decision framework DF and a practical
assumption-based framework
pabfDF(G) = 〈LDF,RDF,AsmDF, ConDF〉, we define
Σ = {∼ deleted(r) ∈ AsmDF | r ∈ T and head(r) ∈ {g,¬g} and g ∈ G−RV}
as the set of goal rules considered in this PABF.
The practical assumption-based argumentation frameworks built upon a decision framework
and associated with some goals include (or not) the rules concluding these goals which are
more or less prior. This allows us to associate the set PABFSDF(G) with a priority relation,
denoted P , modeling the intuition that, in solving a decision problem, high-ranked goals are
preferred to low-ranked goals.
Definition 21 (Priority over PABF). Let DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework,
G ∈ G a set of goals such that G ⊇ RV and PABFSDF(G) be the set of PABFs associated with the goals
G.
∀G1,G2 such that RV ⊆ G1,G2 ⊆ G ∀pabfDF(G1),pabfDF(G2) ∈ PABFSDF(G),
pabfDF(G1)PpabfDF(G2) iff:
• G1 ⊃ G2, and
• ∀g1 ∈ G1 \ G2 there is no g2 ∈ G2 such that g2Pg1.
Due to the properties of set inclusion, the priority relation P is transitive, irreflexive and
asymmetric over PABFSDF(G).
In order to illustrate the previous notions, let us go back to our example.
Example 9 (PABF). Given the decision framework (cf example 3) capturing the decision problem
of the buyer (RV = {fast}). We consider the set of goals {fast,cheap,good}. We
denote this set G. We will consider the collection of practical assumption-based argumentation
frameworks PABFSDF(G).
Let pabfDF(G) = 〈LDF,RDF,AsmDF, ConDF〉 be a practical assumption-based argumentation
framework in PABFSDF(G). This PABF is defined as follows:
• LDF = DL ∪ {deleted}, where DL is defined as in the previous example and deleted
specifies if a rule does not hold;
• RDF is defined by the rules in Table 3;
• AsmDF = ∆ ∪ Γ ∪ Υ ∪ Σ where:
– ∆ = {s(x) | x ∈ {a,b,c,d}},
– Φ = {reply(y) | y ∈ {accept,reject}},
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– Ψ = { ∼ deleted(f11), ∼ deleted(f12), ∼ deleted(f13) ∼ deleted(f21), ∼
deleted(f22), ∼ deleted(f23), ∼ deleted(f31), ∼ deleted(f32),
∼ deleted(f33), ∼ deleted(f41), ∼ deleted(f42), ∼ deleted(f43) },
– Υ = {∼ deleted(r31)(x),∼ deleted(r32)(x)},
– Σ ⊆ {∼ deleted(r11(x)),∼ deleted(r12(x)),∼ deleted(r21(x)),
∼ deleted(r22(x))};
• ConDF is defined trivially. In particular,
Con(s(x)) = {s(y) | y = x},
for each r, deleted(r) ∈ Con(∼ deleted(r)) if ∼ deleted(r) ∈ AsmDF.
The possible sets Σ considered for the definition of the practical assumption-based argumentation
framework pabfDF(Gi) ∈ PABFSDF(G) (with 1 ≤ i ≤ 6) are such that:
• G1 = {cheap,good,fast} with
Σ1 = {∼ deleted(r11(x)),∼ deleted(r12(x)),
∼ deleted(r21(x)),∼ deleted(r22(x)),
∼ deleted(r31(x)),∼ deleted(r32(x))};
• G2 = {good,fast} with
Σ2 = {∼ deleted(r21(x)),∼ deleted(r22(x)),
∼ deleted(r31(x)),∼ deleted(r32(x))};
• G3 = {good,fast} with
Σ3 = {∼ deleted(r21(x)),∼ deleted(r22(x)),
∼ deleted(r31(x)),∼ deleted(r32(x))};
• G4 = {fast} with
Σ4 = {∼ deleted(r31(x)),∼ deleted(r32(x))}.
It is clear that pabfDF(G1)PpabfDF(G2), pabfDF(G1)PpabfDF(G3),
pabfDF(G2)PpabfDF(G4) and pabfDF(G3)PpabfDF(G4).
Having defined the PABFs, we show how a structured argument as in Definition 10
corresponds to an argument in one of the PABFs. To do this, we first define amapping between
a structured argument and a set of assumptions.
Definition 22 (Mapping between arguments). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework. Let A¯ be a structured argument in A(DF)
and concluding α ∈ DL. The corresponding set of assumptions deducing α (denoted ℓ(A¯)) is defined
according to the nature of A¯.
• If A¯ is a hypothetical argument, then ℓ(A¯) = {α}.
• If A¯ is a trivial argument built upon the fact f , then ℓ(A¯) = {∼ deleted( f )}.
• If A¯ is a tree argument, then
ℓ(A¯) = {∼ deleted(r1), . . . ,∼ deleted(rn)} ∪ {L1, . . . , Lm} where:
(i) r1, . . . , rn are the rules of A¯;
(ii) the literals L1, . . . , Lm are the presumptions and the decision literals of A¯.
The mapping is materialized through a bijection ℓ: A(DF) → AsmDF where AsmDF is the set
of possible assumptions of one of the PABFs built upon DF and A(DF) is the set of structured
arguments built upon DF. If S¯ is a set of arguments A(DF), we denote ℓ(S¯) the corresponding
set of assumptions. Formally,
ℓ(S¯) = {ℓ(A¯) | A¯ ∈ S¯}
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expensive← s(x),Price(x,high),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r11(x))
cheap← s(x),Price(x,low),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r12(x))
good← s(x),Resolution(x,high),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r21(x))
bad← s(x),Resolution(x,low),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r22(x))
fast← s(x),DeliveryTime(x,low),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r31(x))
slow← s(x),DeliveryTime(x,high),reply(accept),∼ deleted(r32(x))
Price(a,high) ←∼ deleted( f11)
Resolution(a,low) ←∼ deleted( f12)
DeliveryTime(a,high) ←∼ deleted( f13)
Price(b,high) ←∼ deleted( f21)
Resolution(b,high) ←∼ deleted( f22)
DeliveryTime(b,high) ←∼ deleted( f23)
Price(c,high) ←∼ deleted( f31)
Resolution(c,low) ←∼ deleted( f32)
DeliveryTime(c,low) ←∼ deleted( f33)
Price(d,low) ←∼ deleted( f41)
Resolution(d,low) ←∼ deleted( f42)
DeliveryTime(d,low) ←∼ deleted( f43)
Table 3. The rules of the PABF
There is a one-to-one mapping between arguments in our AF and arguments in some
corresponding PABFs.
Lemma 1 (Mapping between arguments). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework, G ∈ G a set of goals and PABFSDF(G) be
the set of PABFs associated with the goals G.
1. Given a structured argument built upon DF concluding α ∈ DL, there is a corresponding argument
deducing α in some PABFs of PABFS(G).
2. Given an atomic formula α ∈ DL and an argument of a PABF in PABFS(G) deducing α, there
exists a corresponding structured argument in A(DF) concluding α.
Let us consider the previous example.
Example 10 (Assumptions). The arguments in some PABFs corresponding to the structured
arguments D¯2 and C¯ include the following set of assumptions:
• ℓ(D¯2) = {∼ deleted(r31(d)),∼ deleted(f43),s(d),reply(accept)};
• ℓ(C¯) = {∼ deleted(r31(c)),∼ deleted(f33),s(c),reply(accept)};
Both of them are tree argument. The corresponding set of assumptions ℓ(D¯2) considers the literals
∼ deleted(r31(d)) and ∼ deleted(f43) since D¯2 is built upon these rules. Moreover, the literal
s(d) (respectively reply(accept)) is a decision literal (respectively a presumption).
In order to compute our extension-based semantics, we explore the collection of PABFs
associated to our AF in order to find the PABF which deduces the strongest goals as possible.
Indeed, we have developed a mechanism to explore the collection of PABFs associated to our
AF in order to compute it. If a s-admissible set of structured arguments concludes some goals,
then there is a corresponding admissible set of assumptions in one of the correspondingPABFs
and there is no other PABF, where an admissible set of assumptions deduces stronger goals.
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Theorem 1 (Mapping between semantics). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework and
AF = 〈A(DF), defeats 〉 be our argumentation framework for decision making. Let us consider
G ∈ G with G ⊇ RV .
• If there is a s-admissible set of structured arguments S¯1 concluding G1 with RV ⊆ G1 ⊆ G
such there is no s-admissible set of structured arguments concluding G2 with RV ⊆ G2 ⊆ G with
G2PG1, then there is pabf1 ∈ PABFSDF(G) such that the corresponding set of assumptions ℓ(S¯1)
is admissible within pabf1 and there is no pabf2 ∈ PABFSDF(G), with pabf2Ppabf1, which
contains an admissible set of assumptions deducing G2.
• If there is pabf1 ∈ PABFSDF(G) which contains an admissible set of assumptions A1 deducing
G1 withRV ⊆ G1 ⊆ G such that there is no pabf2 ∈ PABFSDF(G), with pabf2Ppabf1, which
contains an admissible set of assumptions deducing G2 with RV ⊆ G2 ⊆ G and G2PG1, then the
corresponding structured arguments ℓ−1(A1) concluding G1 is in a s-admissible set and there is no
other structured arguments S¯2 concluding G2 which is in a s-admissible set.
4. Implementation
The implementation of our framework is called MARGO. We describe here its usage in
particular in the context of service-oriented agents. MARGO stands for Multiattribute
ARGumentation framework for Opinion explanation. MARGO is written in Prolog and
available in GPL (GNU General Public License) at http://margo.sourceforge.net/.
In order to be computed by MARGO, the file, which describes the decision problem, contains:
• a set of decisions, i.e. some lists which contain the alternatives courses of actions;
• possibly a set of incompatibilities, i.e. some couples such that the first component is
incompatible with the second component;
• possibly a set of symmetric incompatibilities, i.e. some couples such that the first
component is incompatible with the second component and conversely;
• a set of decisions rules, i.e. some triples of name - head - body which are simple Prolog
representations of the decision rules in our AF;
• possibly a set of goal rules, i.e. some triples of name - head - body which are simple Prolog
representations of the goal rules in our AF;
• possibly a set of epistemic rules, i.e. some triples of name - head - body which are simple
Prolog representations of the epistemic rules in our AF;
• possibly a set of priorities, some couples of goals such that the former have priority over
the latter;
• a set of presumable belief literals;
• a reservation value, i.e. a list which contains the minimal set of goals which needs to be
reached.
We can note that the incompatibilities between themutual exclusive alternatives are implicit in
the MARGO language. It is worth noticing that MARGO attempts to narrow the gap between
the specification of the decision framework and the corresponding code.
The main predicate admissible(+G,?AG, ?AD) succeeds when AG are the acceptable
goals extracted form G and AD are the acceptable decisions. The predicate for argument
manipulation admissibleArgument(+C, ?P, ?S) succeeds when P are the premises and
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S are the presumptions of an argument deriving the conclusion C and this argument is in a
subjectively admissible set.
Example 11 (Usage). Figure 3 depicts our example, as described in Section 3.2, in the MARGO
syntax.
admissible([cheap, fast, good], AG, AD) returns:
AG = [cheap, fast]
AD = [s(d)]
admissibleArgument(cheap,P,S) returns:
P = [s(c), price(c,low), reply(accept)]
S = [s(c),reply(accept)]
MARGO has been used for service composition and orchestration within the ARGUGRID
project5. As discussed in (Toni et al., 2008), the ArguGRID system contains a semantic
composition environment, allowing users to interact with their agents, and a gridmiddleware
for the actual deployment of services. Service-oriented computing is an interesting test
bed for multi-agent system techniques, where agents need to adopt a variety of roles
that will empower them to provide services in open and distributed systems. Moreover,
service-oriented computing can benefit from multi-agent systems technologies by adopting
the coordination mechanisms, interaction protocols, and decision-making tools designed for
multi-agent systems, e.g. MARGO.
Bromuri et al. (Bromuri et al., 2009) have demonstrated the use of a fully decentralised
multi-agent system supporting agent-automated service discovery, agent-automated service
selection, and agent-automated negotiation of Service Level Agreements (SLAs) for the
selected services.
Requester agents select services according to their suitability to fulfil high-level user
requirements. These agents use argumentation in order to assess suitability and identify
“optimal” services. They argue internally using our concrete argumentation system linking
decisions on selecting services, (a possibly incomplete description of) the features of these
services, the benefits that these features guarantee (under possibly incomplete knowledge).
The ArguGRID system uses the MARGO tool for multi-attribute qualitative decision-making
to support the decision on suitable services.
As soon as the requester agents identify a suitable service, it engages in a negotiation process
with the provider agent for that service. The negotiation aims at agreeing a SLA on the
usage of the identified service, and is conducted using a realisation of the minimal concession
strategy of (Morge & Mancarella, 2010). According to this, agents start the negotiation with
their best offers. During the negotiation, an agent may concede or stand still. It concedes
minimally if the other agent has conceded in the previous step or it is making a move in the
third step of the negotiation (after offers by both agents have been put forward). It stands
still if the other agent has stood still in the previous step. This strategy has useful properties:
it is guaranteed to terminate and it is in symmetric Nash equilibrium. Both requester and
provider agents use MARGO, during negotiation, in order to decide their offers and whether
to concede or stand still.
5 http://www.argugrid.eu
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decision([s(X)]).
decisionrule(r11(X), expensive,
[s(X), price(X,high), reply(accept)]).
decisionrule(r12(X), cheap,
[s(X), price(X,low), reply(accept)]).
decisionrule(r21(X), good,
[s(X), resolution(X,high), reply(accept)]).
decisionrule(r22(X), bad,
[s(X), resolution(X,low), reply(accept)]).
decisionrule(r31(X), fast,
[s(X), deliveryTime(X,low), reply(accept)]).
decisionrule(r32(X), slow,
[s(X), deliveryTime(X,high), reply(accept)]).
epistemicrule(f11, price(a,high), []).
epistemicrule(f12, resolution(a,low), []).
epistemicrule(f13, deliveryTime(a,high), []).
epistemicrule(f21, price(b,high), []).
epistemicrule(f22, resolution(b,high), []).
epistemicrule(f23, deliveryTime(b,high), []).
epistemicrule(f31, price(c,high), []).
epistemicrule(f32, resolution(c,low), []).
epistemicrule(f33, deliveryTime(c,low), []).
epistemicrule(f41, price(d,low), []).
epistemicrule(f42, resolution(d,low), []).
epistemicrule(f43, deliveryTime(d,low), []).
presumable(reply(accept)).
presumable(reply(reject)).
priority(fast, cheap).
priority(fast, good).
rv([fast]).
sincompatibility(fast,slow).
sincompatibility(cheap,expensive).
sincompatibility(good,bad).
Fig. 3. The decision problem of the buyer in the MARGO syntax
5. Related works
Unlike the theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning is not only about whether some beliefs are
true, but also about whether some actions should or should not be performed. The practical
reasoning (Raz, 1978) follows three main steps: i) deliberation, i.e. the generation of goals; ii)
means-end reasoning, i.e. the generation of plans; iii) decision-making, i.e. the selection of plans
that will be performed to reach the selected goals.
Argumentation has been put forward as a promising approach to support decision
making (Fox& Parsons, 1997). While influence diagrams and belief networks (Oliver & Smith,
1988) require that all the factors relevant for a decision are identified a priori, arguments are
defeasible or reinstantiated in the light of new information not previously available.
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Amgoud & Prade (2009) present a general and abstract argumentation framework for
multi-criteria decision making which captures the mental states (goals, beliefs and
preferences) of the decision makers. For this purpose, the arguments prescribe actions to
reach goals if theses actions are feasible under certain circumstances. These arguments,
eventually conflicting, are balanced according to their strengths. Our specific and concrete
argumentation framework is in conformance with this approach. The argumentation-based
decision making process envisaged by (Amgoud & Prade, 2009) is split in different steps
where the arguments are successively constructed, weighted, confronted and evaluated.
By contrast, our computation interleaves the construction of arguments, the construction
of counterarguments, the evaluation of the generated arguments and the determination of
concessions. Moreover, our argumentation-based decision process suggests some decisions
even if low-ranked goals cannot be reached.
Bench-Capon & Prakken (2006) formalize defeasible argumentation for practical reasoning.
As in (Amgoud & Prade, 2009), they select the best course of actions by confronting and
evaluating arguments. Bench-Capon & Prakken focus on the abductive nature of practical
reasoning which is directly modelled within in our framework.
(Kakas & Moraitis, 2003) propose an argumentation-based framework for decision making
of autonomous agents. For this purpose, the knowledge of the agent is split and localized
in different modules representing different capabilities. As (Bench-Capon & Prakken,
2006) and (Amgoud & Prade, 2009), their framework is a particular instantiation of the
abstract argumentation (Dung, 1995). Whereas Kakas & Moraitis (2003) is committed to one
argumentation semantics, we can deploy our framework to several semantics by relying on
assumption-based argumentation.
Rahwan et al. (2003) distinguish different approaches for automated negotiation, including
game-theoretic approaches (e.g Rosenschein & Zlotkin (1994)), heuristic-based approaches
(e.g. Faratin et al. (1998)) and argumentation-based approaches (e.g. Amgoud et al. (2007);
Bench-Capon & Prakken (2006); Kakas & Moraitis (2003)) which allow for more sophisticated
forms of interaction. By adopting the argumentation-based approach of negotiation, agents
deal naturally with new information in order to mutually influence their behaviors. Indeed,
the two first approaches do not allow agents for exchanging opinions about offers. By
arguing (even if it is internally), agents can take into account the information given by its
interlocutors in a negotiation process (eg. rejecting some offers). Moreover, the agents
can make some concessions. In this perspective, Amgoud et al. (2007) propose a general
framework for argumentation-based negotiation. They define formally the notions of
concession, compromise and optimal solution. Our argumentation-based mechanism for
decision making can be used for exploiting such a feature. Morge & Mancarella (2010) have
proposed a realisation of the minimal concession strategy. By contrast, we have focus in
this paper on the concession-based mechanism of MARGO which model the intuition that
high-ranked goals are preferred to low-ranked goals which can be withdrawn. We adopt
a decision principle that is so higher-ranked goals should be pursued at the expense of
lower-ranked goals, and thus concessions enforcing higher-ranked goals should be preferred
to those enforcing lower-ranked goals. To our best knowledge, our argumentation framework
is the first concrete system including such a mechanism.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, few implementation of argumentation over actions
exist. CaSAPI6 (Gartner & Toni, 2007) and DeLP7 (García & Simari, 2004) are restricted to
6 http://www.doc.ic.ac.uk/~dg00/casapi.html
7 http://lidia.cs.uns.edu.ar/DeLP
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the theoretical reasoning. PARMENIDES8 (Atkinson et al., 2006) is a software to structure the
debate over actions by adopting a particular argumentation scheme. GORGIAS9 (Demetriou
& Kakas, 2003) implements an argumentation-based framework to support the decision
making of an agent within a modular architecture. Like the latter, our implementation,
called MARGO, incorporates abduction on missing information. Moreover, we can easily
extend it to compute the competing semantics since MARGO is built upon CaSAPI which is
an argumentation engine that implements the dispute derivations described in (Dung et al.,
2007).
6. Discussion
To our best knowledge, our argumentation-based mechanism for decision-making is the
only concrete argumentation system allowing concessions which is a crucial feature for
negotiations. Our framework is built upon assumption-based argumentation frameworks,
and provides mechanisms to evaluate decisions, to suggest decisions, and to interactively
explain in an intelligibleway the choice which has beenmade tomake a certain decision, along
with the concessions, if any, made to support this choice. The underlying language in which
all the components of a decision problem are represented is a logic-based language, in which
preferences can be attached to goals. In our framework, arguments are defined by means
of tree-structures, thus facilitating their intelligibility. The concession-based mechanism is a
crucial feature of our framework required in different applications such as service selection
or agent-based negotiation. Our framework has been implemented and actually exploited in
different application domains, such as agent-based negotiation (Bromuri et al., 2009; Morge
& Mancarella, 2010), service-oriented agents (Guo et al., 2009), resource allocation (Morge
et al., 2009), computational model of trust (Matt et al., 2010) or embodied conversational
agents (Morge et al., 2010).
Our decision model only allows qualitative representation of goals. However, in many
practical applications, it is not natural to give a quantitative representation of goals. For
this purpose, it would be best to have a hybrid approach combining both quantitative and
qualitative aspects. Argumentation provides a natural framework for these hybrid systems
by providing a link between qualitative objectives and its quantitative representation.
7. Appendix A. Proofs
This appendix includes the proofs considered in this paper.
Proof 1 (Mapping between arguments). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework, G ∈ G a set of goals and PABFSDF(G) be
the set of PABFs associated with the goals G ⊇ RV .
1. Let A¯ be a structured argument concluding α ∈ DL. The corresponding argument in some of the
PABFs (denoted ℓ(A¯)) is defined in Definition 22.
2. Let us consider α an atomic formula in DL and a: A ⊢ α be an argument within one PABF in
PABFSDF(L).
• Either α ∈ AsmDF. Therefore, α is deduced by the singleton {α} and ℓ
−1(A) = A¯ is a
hypothetical argument defined such that:
8 http://cgi.csc.liv.ac.uk/~katie/Parmenides.html
9 http://www.cs.ucy.ac.cy/~nkd/gorgias/
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conc(A¯) = α,
premise(A¯) = ∅,
psm(A¯) = {α},
sent(A¯) = {α}.
• Or α ∈ AsmDF. Therefore, α is deduced by the set of premises A which, by definition, are all
assumptions inAsmDF and, by construction, there is only one rule r with∼ deleted(r) ∈ A
such as head(r) = α.
– Either r is a fact of T deducing α and so, ℓ−1(A) = A¯ is a trivial argument defined such
that:
conc(A¯) = α,
premise(A¯) = {⊤},
psm(A¯) = ∅,
sent(A¯) = {α}.
– Otherwise r is a rule of T deducing α with a non-empty body and so, ℓ−1(A) = A¯ is a tree
argument built upon the subarguments sbarg(A¯) defined such that:
conc(A¯) = α,
premise(A¯) = body(r),
psm(A¯) = ∪A¯′∈sbarg(A¯)psm(A¯
′),
sent(A¯) = body(r) ∪ {head(r)} ∪
⋃
A¯
′
∈sbarg(A¯)
sent(A¯′).
Proof 2 (Mapping between semantics). Let
DF = 〈DL,Psm, I , T ,P ,RV〉 be a decision framework and
AF = 〈A(DF), defeats 〉 be our argumentation framework for decision making. Let us consider
G ∈ G with G ⊇ RV .
• Let us consider a s-admissible set of structured arguments S¯1 concluding G1 ⊆ G. Due to the
lemma 1, we can built the set of arguments S1 such that for any structured argument A¯1 ∈ S¯1
there is an argument a1 ∈ S1, where a1 : ℓ(A¯1) ⊢ L is in some PABFSDF(G). We consider here
pabf1DF(G1) ∈ PABFSDF(G) where all the arguments appear. Due to the construction of S1,
the set of arguments A(ℓ(S¯1)) is conflict-free and defend itself within pabf1DF(G). Therefore,
S1 is an admissible set. Let us consider a different pabf2DF(G2) ∈ PABFSDF(G) such that
pabf2DF(G2)Ppabf
1
DF(G1). Due to the definition 21, G2 ⊇ G1 and ∀g2 ∈ G2 \ G1 there is no
g1 ∈ G1 such that g1Pg2. If we suppose that pabf2DF(G) contains an admissible set of arguments
deducing G2, then the corresponding set of structured arguments concluding G2 is admissible. It is
not the case.
• Let us consider pabf1 ∈ PABFSDF(G) which contains an admissible set of assumptions A1
deducing G1 with RV ⊆ G1 ⊆ G. If we suppose that there is no pabf2 ∈ PABFSDF(G), with
pabf2Ppabf1, which contains an admissible set of assumptions deducing G2 ⊆ G with G2PG1,
then the corresponding s-admissible set of structured arguments ℓ−1(A1) concludes G1 and there is
no other s-admissible set of structured arguments S¯2 concluding G2.
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